Logocracy - Chapter 17: Parliament

The bicameral structure of logocratic parliament

The Opening, Commonwealth Parliament, Charles Nuttall (1901-1902)

Practically all nations today have parliaments of one sort or another. The day of the absolute monarch is dead—unless you count Saudi Arabia.¹ The task of a logocracy is to create one that is efficient, constructive, with a holistic understanding of its nation and place in the world, and which actually represents its constituents. As such, it is to embody the logocratic principle of the sovereignty of society (not so-called public sovereignty, which is an impossible idealization at best, or a deliberate paralogism at worst). Contemporary parliaments cannot be said to realize this principle to any serious degree.

This sovereignty principle can only be effected if the principle of competence is allowed to operate normally. The latter is a precondition for the former, defining the standards for political candidates, and the overall governing principle of both political and social structure.

Currently, parliaments are hampered by partisan infighting, a focus on trivial policies, and a short-term outlook. They don’t take seriously questions of psychological, social, economic, or political realities, and their structures aren’t always suited to their nations’ conditions, such as size, traditions, or overall political organization. Lobaczewski recommends a unicameral parliament for smaller nations and members of a federation, and bicameral ones for larger nations and federal parliaments.

However, upper and lower houses have their own unique characters, and the methods of selection for each should reflect those differences. For lower houses, candidates should be put forward by parties, the logocratic associations, and other groups, to be voted on by those with citizenship rights. There will be two types: land MPs, who will represent the populations of individual districts, and political MPs, who will represent organizations and institutions, and the nation as a whole. Land MPs will outnumber political ones. Terms will last six years, with 50% replaced in elections every three years (and presumably no right for re-election).

For upper houses (senates), candidates will be drawn from former MPs and other higher office holders. As with the lower house, there will be two types: representative and parliamentary senators. A set number of representative senators will be appointed, one each, by the president, the wise council, each of the five independent powers, the most populous religious denomination, those representing the population living abroad, and those national institutions (e.g. scientific) granted the right to do so by law. The remainder—parliamentary senators—will be chosen by the lower house from among candidates put forward by these same institutions or those agreed upon by small groups of MPs. (An alternative would be for the remaining senators to be elected in districts from a pool only of those with parliamentary rights.) Senators’ terms would be three years, but re-election would be common and only limited by age. Early removal of representative senators would be possible, but not common.

Lobaczewski thinks overly large parliaments are bad for several reasons: the more MPs, the lower its average level of skill; the greater the chances of groupthink and something like mass formation; the more likely they are to split off into competing factions. As for the number of MPs and senators:

[While he doesn’t mention it in this chapter, presumably he would recommend a stronger, bottom-up federal structure for larger nations to avoid bloated parliaments, each region of which would have its own unicameral parliament. This is in reference to the problem of gigantism (or macropathy) which he mentions in Political Ponerology, where he recommends a population cap of somewhere in the low tens of millions for nations. The U.S., for instance, could be divided into 13 mini-nations, with populations of 20-30 million each, to avoid the problems of macropathy associated with nations with hundreds of millions (or more) of inhabitants.]

The lower house will meet for ordinary session in the fall, lasting up to three months, but dispersing before Christmas. The president or senate will have the right to convene extraordinary sessions. The upper house will work on a more permanent basis, for six to nine months of the year.

Both houses, as well as the president and his government, will have legislative initiative. Bills will be decided by simple or qualified majorities (e.g. 60%), and due to the structure of a logocratic parliament (as well as attendance requirements),

there will be no practice, sometimes necessary in a democracy, of passing laws in the absence of many members or with many abstentions, thus creating public distrust or leading to immature resolutions.

The head of state’s influence over the parliament is as follows: In addition to his right of legislative initiative and the presence of his representative senator, if a bill passes with only simple majorities in both chambers, it will require his signature (or veto). In contrast, if it is passed by a qualified majority in both chambers (or simple in the lower, and qualified in the upper), it will become law without his signature. Bills passed by the senate outside the sessions of the lower house would also require presidential approval. He can also approve the election of the president of the council of ministers if the vote fails to achieve a qualified majority.

The senate will also be responsible for: “the selection of candidates for the office of head of state, the election of members of the council of the wise, the approval of the head of state’s approval of the heads of independent authorities.”

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Chapter 17: Parliament

Logocracy is based on the principle of the sovereignty of society as an association of citizens responsible for their own destiny and that of future generations. It will realize this idea in an improved way based on the understanding of the laws of nature and psychological realism. Therefore, the general principles of the logocratic system and their positive solutions will seek to ensure that the nation is represented by people respected for their integrity, and scientifically prepared to make decisions of public importance and to legislate appropriate laws.

Parliament has become a form of representation of the people shaped by history as a legacy of democratic systems. However, only a parliament capable of meeting its daunting tasks in an efficient, constructive manner, and arising from an understanding of the totality of the country’s affairs and its political situation, is a true representation of the nation, its will to live and develop. This is how a logocratic parliament should work.

A parliament incapable of reading the signs of the times, of understanding the needs of the nation as a whole and its situation in the world, and of framing laws sufficiently considered in the proper perspective of the future, fails to realize the principle of the sovereignty of society. For the practical composition, organization of this representation, and its work have often proved unsatisfactory to such an extent that the said principle cannot be considered to be realized in a manner consistent with natural law. We can find any number of such examples in history. In Poland, unfortunately, the Four-Year Sejm, the Sejm of the interwar period, and more recently, in a formally independent country, operated in this way.²

Under such conditions, forces—usually patriotic but not democratic, or inspired by foreign or secret societies—begin to strive for the overthrow or reduction of parliamentary rule and the establishment of more efficient strongman rule. Such groups preach a certain ideology and carry a ready-made plan of action. This plan is soon exhausted or eroded and improvisation and later degeneration of such a system of government begins. Within the inefficiency of parliamentary democracy lies the seedbed for the emergence of dictatorships. Mindful of the incalculable consequences of such upheavals, we want to provide the nation with parliamentary representation that acts efficiently and prudently, which is the best assurance of lasting and just government.

For the above reasons, the principle of competence already discussed should operate as a natural law, inscribed in the first part of the constitution, and should also find permanent residence in the thinking and practice of a logocratically governed nation. The principle of competence defines in general terms the requirements to be met by a candidate for election as a member of parliament or senator. Parliament itself will regulate these matters by its resolutions. Additional requirements may be introduced, such as the obligation to declare in advance the legislative fields for which the candidate is specially prepared. The logocratic association will be inclined to put forward candidates for the value of their minds and characters, scientifically well prepared for parliamentary work.

All these undertakings will lead to a weakening of partisan rancor, and will privilege discussions of substance and decisions aimed at the general good of the nation seen in a sufficiently long perspective. It is of the utmost importance that parliament be able to penetrate as deeply as possible into questions of psychological, social, economic, and political causality. A logocratic parliament will thus be much more efficient than a democratic one. Besides, the manner of organization and the number of members of the parliament will depend on the size of the nation in question, its traditions, and its situation as an independent nation or as one associated in a larger federation.

A unicameral parliament would be preferable for small nations, up to ten million, or medium-sized nations, but associated with other nations where there is a federal parliament, usually bicameral. For larger and more independent nations a bicameral parliament is preferable and such a solution seems to be justified by historical experience in which the operation of natural laws has become apparent.³ For discussion between chambers of sufficiently different character leads to a more mature legislative product. According to the operation of the aforementioned laws, it is necessary to adopt such modes of electing senators in particular that this different character of the two chambers is permanently preserved. Therefore, in a logocracy, the universal election of senators, only with limitations on the age of the electors and candidates, could not be said to conform to these requirements.

New solutions come to mind which could ensure a sufficiently different character of the two chambers for a larger country, where history has already obliterated the old state divisions. Therefore, I will propose below some concepts, first of all for Poland, looking for solutions which could result in greater resilience of the parliament, and therefore could be advisable for a country with a difficult geopolitical situation.

The lower house, the Sejm in Poland, would be elected by the inhabitants of the country who have the right of citizenship, from among citizens who have qualified for parliamentary office. Candidates would be put forward by a logocratic association, political parties, or groups of citizens of a certain size. Under the logocracy principle, voters would always vote by name, which to some extent tilts the balance in favor of candidates with better character values. When television invites candidates into voters’ homes, it engages people’s natural intuition. Voting would take place in multi-member districts, where different groups could present their candidates, usually one at a time, and voters would have a chance to get an idea of their characters among not too many of them.

The lower house of parliament is the direct representation of the people and should therefore consist of MPs representing individual districts and MPs elected from nationwide lists announced by the logocratic association and political parties. Let us call the former the land MPs, the latter the political MPs. A land MP represents all citizens of his district regardless of their political orientation. A political MP represents the organization that put him forward and the people of the country. The ratio of the two types of MPs would be set so that the land MPs would always constitute a moderate majority. The manner in which political MPs are chosen could vary. Either individual candidates would be assigned to constituencies and voters would cast two votes, or it would be calculated in proportion to the number of votes cast for MPs from a particular party or logocratic association. The former option, as being more in line with logocratic principles, seems preferable.

The above solution is reminiscent of the analogous provisions of the German constitution, which turned out to be a deliberately clever way of mastering certain difficulties. Similarly, a five percent minimum for the first MP on the central list could be adopted, but this does not seem necessary in a logocracy. Six years should be adopted as the duration of an MP’s term of office, which would allow him to enter into the duties of an MP and make use of his experience. Elections, however, would be held every three years, renewing half of the chamber. Thus, in the first election after the adoption of the logocracy system, half of the MPs who passed with a lower number of votes would be given a three-year term.

Land MPs should remain in constant communication with the citizens of their district, looking after their welfare and that of their area. Political MPs should be more mobile, maintaining national and foreign contacts. Citizens living abroad should elect their own MPs.

A senator will be eligible to be elected as a citizen of the country who has been a member of parliament for at least half a term or has held a higher office for at least three years. The list of these offices will be established by the electoral law. The latter requirement will not apply to the first logocratic election. And here are the proposals for how senators will be elected: The right to appoint one senator shall be vested in the head of state, in the council of the wise, in all independent authorities, in the most numerous religious denomination, in Poland the Catholic Church, and also in the representation of the Polish community abroad, and in those national institutions mostly scientific, which shall be granted this privilege by a law which shall define accordingly the different modes of election of these senators, called representatives. The other senators shall be chosen by the Lower House, by a simple majority of votes, from among the candidates proposed by the same institutions or by seven MPs. The senate would thus consist of about seventeen representative senators and the rest called parliamentary senators. Thus the senate would enjoy a kind of ceding of the powers of the lower house in exceptional circumstances.

Other possibilities for obtaining a senate sufficiently different in character from the lower house would be to increase the number of institutions entitled to elect a senator to the number prevailing in the senate. This could also be the result of the evolution of the logocratic system. One could also adopt a version in which the remaining senators are elected in districts only by those with parliamentary rights. These versions would no longer give the senate an explicit right to the said ceding of powers of the lower house.

Senators would be elected for three-year terms, but their re-election would become common practice and would be limited only by their age. The Sejm would elect its senators and a number of substitute senators every three years in case of the incapacity of some to continue in office. The authorized institutions would have, for good and manifest cause, the right of early removal of a representative senator and the election of a new one, which, however, should not occur frequently.

The numbers of both the lower and upper houses should be balanced so that both houses can have members experienced in different areas of work and politics, but at the same time so that they are not overly numerous. The more numerous a parliament is, the worse must be its average level of skill. A parliament that is too numerous tends to produce difficulties caused by the action of psychological induction, as happens in the mass of humanity. There is also then a need for separation in less numerous groups, which intensifies unnecessary differences and makes compromise difficult.

I propose that this number should be about one MP per 120,000 inhabitants, and one senator per half a million. For Poland the fixed figures of 333 MPs and 77 senators could be adopted. The proportions given do not, of course, apply to federal parliaments.

The Sejm will meet once a year for an ordinary session in the fall. The duration of this session will not be standardized, but will customarily last up to three months and MPs will disperse before December 24. The head of state and the senate will have the right to convene extraordinary sessions. The upper house of parliament should work permanently with necessary breaks for rest and travel of senators.

Both houses of parliament will have the right of legislative initiative. This right will be held by the head of state and the government. The two chambers will decide by a simple or qualified majority, according to the provisions of the constitution, but always with respect to the statutory number of senators or MPs. Since it will be easier to achieve a higher quantitative consensus in a logocratic parliament than in a democratic one, the requirement of a majority with respect to the full number of members of the chambers should not impede the smooth operation of parliament. Thus, there will be no practice, sometimes necessary in a democracy, of passing laws in the absence of many members or with many abstentions, thus creating public distrust or leading to immature resolutions. Members of the chambers will, however, have to observe a certain discipline of attendance, from which they can be exempted only for important reasons.

The majority numbers would be fixed and widely known, making it easier for the public to scrutinize parliamentary action. Qualified majorities would be similarly fixed. For the numbers of the chambers of the Polish parliament adopted above, I propose a qualified majority of 201/333 in the Sejm, and two qualified majorities in the Senate: a lower one of 45/77 and a higher one of 51/77.

A law passed by a qualified majority in both chambers, or by a simple majority in the Sejm and a higher qualified majority in the Senate, will enter into force without the signature of the head of state. A law passed by a simple majority in both chambers, possibly also approved in the senate only by a lower qualified majority will require the president’s signature. The right of legislative initiative, the presence of his representative senator, and the above power will give the head of state sufficient influence over the legislature for Polish conditions.

A higher qualified majority would also be required in order for the Senate to exercise the privilege arising from the aforementioned partial ceding of the powers of the lower house, for passing a resolution outside the sessions of the latter, which would always require the approval of the head of state.

The extension of the president’s term will require a resolution by both chambers with a simple majority. If this resolution fails to pass by the said qualified majority, the president will sign his own election and will be able to refuse to do so. In a similar way, the president of the council of ministers will be elected by both chambers and, if the qualified majority is insufficient, will be approved by the head of state. This may lead to the fact that the prime minister will not represent the most numerous party or will be non-partisan, and his election will be determined by recognition of his qualifications. This will make it easier for him to form an efficient logocratic government.

In addition, most other personnel decisions such as: the selection of candidates for the office of head of state, the election of members of the council of the wise, the approval of the head of state’s approval of the heads of independent authorities, will remain in the hands of the senate itself. This will give this chamber, composed of people already experienced, sufficient power and a certain advantage needed in the structure of the logocratic state.

The senate would work two to three times longer per year than the lower house. The government would be able to submit its bills to the Speaker of the Sejm or to the senate with a request for senatorial refinement of the bill’s content before submitting it to the lower house. The president will always submit his bills to the speaker of the senate and with the help of a representative senator chosen by him. In difficult situations, the government will be able to hope that the necessary legislation will be quickly passed by the senate and approved by the head of state.

The method of electing MPs and senators will be part of the state constitution developed through a scientific process by the Constituent Assembly and cannot be subject to arbitrary manipulation through parliamentary laws. The most general principles of the electoral law will be enumerated in the first part of the constitution and then developed in the second part. It can only be improved through the legally prescribed process of amending the logocratic constitution, as will be discussed in the relevant chapter. Citizens must be able to see and relatively easily understand the workings of all processes related to the election of members of parliament and its workings so that they can ensure adequate representation.

Note: This work is a project of QFG/Red Pill Press and is planned to be published in book form.

1. Or Brunei, Eswatini, or Oman, with populations ranging from around 460k to 4.5 million. Saudi Arabia is the only decently sized country of the bunch, with around 38 million. And it’s Saudi Arabia…

2. HK: The Great Sejm of 1788 to 1792; that of the Second Polish Republic from 1918 to 1939; and that of the Third Republic, since 1989.

3. HK: Unicameralism characterizes around 60% of world legislatures, and an even greater proportion of subnational legislatures. The general trend accords with Lobaczewski’s recommendation: the bigger the population, the more likely the legislature is to be bicameral. Though there are exceptions, most notably China, but also Bangladesh, Vietnam, Turkey, and Iran, which all have unicameral systems despite their large populations. Exceptions at the other end, i.e. small nations of less than 10 million with bicameral legislatures, include nations like Haiti, Belarus, Austria, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Jordan, and Paraguay.